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Abstract
This article explores refugee protection and durable solu-
tions in Africa’s Great Lakes region by examining conflict, 
displacement, and refugees in the light of the crisis of 
citizenship. Drawing on empirical data from nine stud-
ies across the region, we scrutinize the causes of conflict 
and displacement and refugee policies and practice in the 
region through the lens of citizenship. First, we argue that 
the continued plight of many refugees in the region without 
durable solutions results, at least in part, from an endemic 
and systemic inability of many people in the region to 
realize citizenship in a meaningful way. This inability, we 
argue, is a significant contributor to the continued forced 
displacement of millions of people, with many still refugees, 
even after living in the host states for over three decades. 
Second, we argue that solutions are failing because discus-
sions about the root causes of refugee influxes and move-
ments often fail to capture the intricately connected histor-
ical, political, social, economic, religious, and legal factors 
that engender displacement. We submit that full and equal 
enjoyment of the rights and benefits of citizenship by all, 
including access to citizenship for refugees, is one means 
of resolving displacement and providing durable solutions 
to refugees.
Résumé
Cet article s’engage à explorer la question de la protection 
des réfugiés et les solutions durables dans la région des 
Grands Lacs en Afrique en étudiant le problème du conflit, 
du déplacement, et des réfugiés à la lumière de la crise de 
citoyenneté. En nous basant sur des données empiriques 
provenant de neuf études à travers la région, nous exami-
nons de près les causes du conflit et du déplacement, ainsi 
que les politiques et les pratiques portant sur les réfugiés, en 
utilisant l’optique de la citoyenneté. Nous postulons deux 
arguments principaux : premièrement, que le sort tragique 
continu de nombreux réfugiés dans la région dépourvus de 
solutions durables provient, du moins en partie, d’une inca-
pacité systémique et enracinée d’un nombre important de 
personnes dans les pays concernés d’actualiser la citoyenneté 
d’une manière significative ; cette incapacité, nous avançons, 
contribue considérablement au déplacement forcé continu 
de plusieurs millions d’individus, avec de nombreuses per-
sonnes vivant toujours dans leurs pays d’accueil comme 
réfugiés même après plus de trois décennies. Deuxièmement, 
nous soutenons que l’échec des solutions vient du fait que 
souvent les discussions sur les causes profondes de l’influx 
et des déplacements des réfugiés ne prennent pas en compte 
l’enchevêtrement complexe de facteurs historiques, poli-
tiques, sociaux, économiques, religieux, et juridiques à plu-
sieurs niveaux qui engendre le déplacement. Nous proposons 
qu’une pleine et égale jouissance des droits et avantages de 
la citoyenneté de la part de tous, y compris l’ouverture de 
l’accès à la citoyenneté pour les réfugiés, serait un moyen 
possible de résoudre le problème du déplacement, et d’offrir 
aux réfugiés des solutions durables. 
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Introduction
This article explores the intersection between citizen-ship and belonging and displacement and refugees in Africa’s Great Lakes region. Africa’s Great Lakes 
region,1 which witnessed genocide, displacement, and the 
massive production of refugees at the turn of the century 
leaves many questions unanswered.2 Why did the region 
implode? Why have thousands in the region remained refu-
gees for over four decades with no solution in sight? And 
why have thousands more found a formal end to displace-
ment only to be re-displaced? Without claiming to offer 
answers, this article seeks to widen debate3 by analyzing 
forced displacement and the search for durable solutions to 
the plight of refugees through the lens of citizenship. While 
not denying the role played by other factors, the article’s 
central thesis is that the continued plight of many refugees 
in the region without durable solutions results, at least 
in part, from an endemic and systemic inability of many 
people in the region to realize citizenship in a meaningful 
way. This inability, the article contends, is a significant con-
tributor to the continued forced displacement of millions of 
people. Furthermore, just as the failure by many to realize 
the benefits of citizenship is one major cause of displace-
ment, ensuring parity in the enjoyment of its benefits is also 
one means to resolve it.
Theory and Method
We do not situate our analyses in any particular theoretical 
approach to citizenship.4 We theorize citizenship as a status, 
legal or otherwise, that designates full membership in a state 
or community with concomitant rights or entitlements and 
duties, including the right and duty to challenge inequality in 
that state or community. This provides the starting point for 
our analysis. Citizenship differs from nationality. Nationality 
is a status acquired by birth in a given country. A person is a 
national of a given country by birth, while a person is a citizen 
of a given country either by birth or registration or natural-
ization. Nationality as used in international law is concerned 
with the “belonging of a person to a state,”5 or the legal bond 
between an individual and a sovereign state, which entitles 
that state to espouse claims on behalf of that national under 
international law.6 People may have multiple citizenships, 
although at international law a particular state’s responsibil-
ities or rights may take precedence in a particular encounter. 
The citizens of a given state may consist of a multiplicity of 
identities and nationalities that share a sense of belonging 
and common values and convictions associated with that 
state. Having full membership in a state or community brings 
with it benefits and costs, rights, and responsibilities.
However, while nationality is often the gateway to citi-
zenship and therefore an important first step to ensure the 
legitimacy to belong, we argue that inclusion within a com-
munity or society needs to be about far more: inclusion has 
to take account of local and regional factors, in particular 
the arbitrariness and fluidity of colonial borders, increasing 
forced displacement, migration and mobility, and the ability 
of citizens to exercise citizenship rights and duties beyond 
the state of origin. Therefore, citizenship is also seen as a 
broader concept capable of absorbing new members beyond 
the nationality status of belonging to a group having the 
same culture, traditions, and history. While possessing cit-
izenship as a legal status conferred by national citizenship 
law plays a crucial part, it does not automatically ensure 
access to and exercising rights as a citizen. Exclusionary 
tendencies continue to resist and deny membership to those 
considered “alien” or “foreign” to the locality defined by a 
particular nationality or ethnicity.
The research demonstrated how some groups and indi-
viduals negotiated their interests within the rigidly defined 
frameworks of belonging—as national citizens, ethnicities, 
or refugees—and found acceptance. These groups and indi-
viduals exercised what we describe as “empirical citizen-
ship.” Some were legally citizens but not indigenous to the 
locality, while others were refugees who legally were not 
citizens, and locally they did not belong there, and yet they 
found a way of being able to negotiate the social, economic, 
and political terrain in which they sojourned and found 
acceptance and exercised a level of mobility and participa-
tion in everyday citizenship activities beyond the national 
borders. We theorize “empirical citizenship” as a status of 
being accepted into a given community as a member, even 
if not originally from there, and being able to exercise 
citizenship rights such as social and economic rights and 
fulfil civic duties, including paying local taxes. The research 
demonstrates that “empirical citizenship” includes the abil-
ity to belong in the community in which people are living; 
and it often includes the realities of forms of belonging that 
cross borders. For refugees in particular, this involved some 
exercise of autonomy in making decisions about return, 
and those decisions often contradicted those of the officials 
who frame and determine when return is possible within a 
formal repatriation paradigm to be triggered by officialdom.
We observed that “empirical citizenship” challenges, 
within the context of the region, and Africa as a whole, a 
rigid notion of citizenship that is tied to the nation state. 
Refugees interviewed seem to opt for a form of flexible cit-
izenship7 that allows them to manoeuvre the treacherous 
terrain of survival in order to optimize their resources for 
the good of themselves and their families. From this per-
spective, we wondered whether citizenship, in its traditional 
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formulation, adequately interrogates the problems of 
belonging, identity, peace, and stability in the region.8
The main question throughout the research, therefore, 
was how citizenship and exclusion affect the creation of, 
experience of, and resolution to displacement. We theorized 
that the inability of many people in the region to realize cit-
izenship in a meaningful way is a root cause of both conflict 
and displacement in the region and the ongoing failure to 
find solutions to exile.
To interrogate how citizenship and exclusion affect the resolution 
of displacement in the Great Lakes Region of Africa, we adopted a 
theoretical approach that allowed us to ground the inquiry within 
the social, economic, political, and legal contexts in which forced 
displacement and exclusion happens. Thus, a socio-legal, theor-
etical framework was adopted. It posits that any study, social or 
legal, should be grounded in its social, economic, political, and 
legal contexts and that analysis of any problem, legal or social, 
should be informed by data collected from the field. Qualitative 
methods of data collection were employed: open-ended questions 
were used in conducting one-on-one interviews with refugees, 
internally displaced persons, returnees, and civil society, and rel-
evant officials in each of the seven countries where fieldwork was 
conducted; policy documents and articles on refugees, displace-
ment, repatriation, and citizenship were also reviewed.9
As with any empirical study, some caveats are in order. 
First, as we used qualitative methods of data collection, 
some limitations are unavoidable. For example, although 
we interviewed a wide range of people, our interviewees 
represent only a small sample of whole populations, and 
therefore any generalizations we make must be read in 
context. In addition, interviews took place in their natural 
settings, and our study may therefore not be replicated.10 
Second, the quality of our data depends, to some extent, on 
our individual research skills and may be prone to personal 
world views. 
These limitations notwithstanding, however, we believe 
collecting data using qualitative methods provided us, first, 
with a more useful way of exploring the complexity of social, 
economic, and political dynamics of displacement in the 
region. Second, it provided us a better understanding and 
descriptions of the personal experiences of the people we 
interviewed about displacement, exclusion, and citizenship 
in the region. Third, we were better able to grasp local situa-
tions, conditions, and stakeholder interests and needs than 
would, for example, quantitative approaches, such as asking 
respondents to complete a questionnaire with “yes” or “no” 
answers to complex set of problems.
Causes of Conflict and Displacement in the Great 
Lakes Region
With the exception of Tanzania, all the countries in the 
region have generated refugees and IDPs in large numbers 
since independence, and all have hosted refugees. Hundreds 
of thousands remain exiled outside or within their country 
with no solutions in sight. Numerous theories have been 
advanced to explain why endemic refugee flows and inter-
nal displacement have occurred in the region and Africa as 
a whole. Dominant in the literature is the extent to which 
the impact and legacy of colonialism is a cause of conflict 
and displacement. The history and evolution of “citizenship” 
in the region, intertwined with the history of the emergence 
of the modern African state, is a turbulent one, reflecting 
many of the wider issues dominating the post-colonial dis-
course. Notions of belonging were irrevocably changed with 
the advent of colonialism, which clearly defined the juris-
diction of the state, redefined the parameters of power,11 and 
regulated the movement of people.12
Mamdani, for instance, argues that crises in Africa are 
manifestations of the crisis of the post-colonial state.13 
His central thesis is that the fault lines of current polit-
ical instabilities and conflicts on the continent lie in the 
processes of the formation of the colonial state, which, he 
contends, resulted in a bifurcated state based on political 
identities of race and ethnicity. The colonial regime crafted 
“institutionally entrenched discrimination” into the colonial 
state by a plurality of laws—one for master and subject races 
and another set of legal regimes for ethnic groups.14
The creation by the colonial regime of a bifurcated 
state with institutionally embedded political identities, 
discrimination, and prejudices is certainly crucial to our 
understanding of the current political crises in the region. 
However, it does not fully explain why most post-independ-
ence leaders, who were presumably aware of the flaws of the 
colonial state and the risks it portended, chose to perpetu-
ate aspects of a system fashioned to exploit resources and 
protect colonial interests, instead of carrying out reforms 
that could have addressed past inequalities and captured 
the diversity of nationalities that made up the mosaic of the 
new states.
The failure by post-independence leaders to build demo-
cratic states with viable institutions that not only allowed 
free entry and exit to political power but also provided 
effective checks and balances to the abuse of power, along-
side inclusive citizenship policies and laws, is a key factor 
in understanding post-independence political instability 
and conflict in the region. Many post-independence lead-
ers in the region, and Africa as a whole (possibly with the 
exception of Julius Kambarage Nyerere of Tanzania), lacked 
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a clear and encompassing vision for their new nations that 
sought to unite rather than divide; to build rather than 
destroy; to be inclusive rather than exclusive; and to be 
confident rather than insecure.15 Although there was much 
rhetoric about national unity by many African heads of 
state—such as post-independence leaders Jomo Kenyatta of 
Kenya, Idi Amin of Uganda, self-styled Emperor Bokasa of 
Central Africa, Mobutu Sese Seko of the former Zaire, and 
Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe—in practice the domineering 
and coercive machinery of the colonial state was often repli-
cated, with little tolerance for alternative views and dissent. 
Their politics and policies perpetuated inequalities and 
marginalization, in particular the polarization of citizens 
or communities along ethnic lines, which became a means 
of holding onto power.
Within this context, autochtone conceptions of belonging 
have thrived and become key determinants of citizenship. 
In autochthone understandings of citizenship the question 
of belonging is implicated by the question of who arrived 
and occupied a given territory first; and the question of who 
settled first is linked to the assertion of indigenousness of 
a particular group or society to the territory in question.16 
Assertions or claims of indigenity in relation to a terri-
tory mean that other groups that are seen as immigrants or 
newcomers to the territory do not “belong”: instead, they 
belong to their own “native” place to which they can return. 
In practice, however, this is not possible, given that many of 
the “newcomers,” or “immigrants,” or “settlers” have lived 
in the contested area for decades, if not centuries. And, as 
the research demonstrates, the turmoil and movement of 
people created by refugee flows in the region has intensified 
this debate.
In addition, the tendency by many commentators to 
attribute the causes of civil wars and political crises in 
Africa to cultural differences—and, in particular, to point 
to ethnicity as the scapegoat for most conflicts in Africa—
is both flawed and misleading. It also risks imposing onto 
African realities solutions that not only treat the symptoms 
rather than the cause, but also assume that the causes of the 
problems are internal, thereby ignoring the role of external 
interests.
Therefore, in addition to the legacy of colonialism and 
the failure of the post-colonial state to address the inad-
equacies that it inherited, has been the inability of the post-
colonial state to accommodate multiple forms of allegiance 
and belonging that would mitigate, rather than cause, con-
flict. Ekeh, in a 1975 seminal article, argues that there are 
two public realms in Africa that determine the “structure of 
modern post-colonial politics in Africa.”17 One is based on 
“primordial groupings, ties, and sentiments,” which “influ-
ence and determine the individual’s public behaviour.”18 
This aspect of the public realm is ethnically based and 
driven by moral imperatives, similar to the function of the 
private realm in Western states.19 The other public realm 
“is historically associated with the colonial administration 
and … has become identified with popular politics in post-
colonial Africa.” It is defined in terms of “military, civil 
service, the police, etc.” Ekeh contends that this aspect of 
the public realm “has no moral linkages with the private 
realm” and calls it “the civic public.” He concludes, “The 
civic public in Africa is amoral and lacks the generalised 
moral imperatives operative in the private realm and pri-
mordial public,” and political actors in the post-colonial 
state operate simultaneously in both public realms, namely 
the civic and primordial publics.20 The dialectical relation-
ship between these two realms, in Ekeh’s view, explains the 
political crises afflicting some states in Africa,21 with clear 
implications for the realization of citizenship.
Thus, we argue that many of the causes of conflict and 
forced displacement, such as human rights violations, the 
struggle over control of political and economic power, eth-
nic conflict and civil war, are symptoms of deeper and inter-
connected problems. In particular, the failure by most post-
colonial leaders to reform the colonial state and reorganize 
power by creating viable institutions that allow free entry 
and exit to political power and socio-economic opportun-
ities and resources, and therefore the failure to address cit-
izenship in a way that allows it to accommodate multiple 
identities lies at the root of recurrent political instability 
and conflicts in the region.
The question, however, is how to reconcile or reverse the 
logic of exclusion and avoid conflicts and civil war. Would 
drafting new national constitutions help to reconcile these 
competing issues and interests in ways that would allow 
those in exile to either have the option of taking new cit-
izenship in their country of exile, or create the conditions 
of “acceptance” necessary to return to their former country 
of habitual residence? And would it allow those at “home” 
to feel a sense of belonging that secures their interests and 
those of their children, thereby diffusing future conflict? 
And, importantly for the purpose of this article, does refu-
gee policy reflect the realities outlined above?
Current Refugee Protection Policy Response and 
Practice
Refugee law and policy, though well established, fail to 
resolve the problem of forced displacement both in address-
ing the root causes of violence, and ensuring an end to exile. 
The conventional policy instruments on refugees are crafted 
with a mindset that conceives refugees as a problem that 
imposes a burden on their hosts and calls for burden-sharing 
amongst states. The three “durable solutions”—repatriation, 
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local integration, and resettlement—reflect this problem-
centric image of the refugee. The research focused primarily 
on the first two of these solutions, both of which are now 
discussed in turn.
Repatriation and Citizenship
Repatriation returns refugees to their country of origin or 
habitual residence. The 1951 Refugee Convention is silent on 
repatriation;22 it says nothing about its nature—voluntary 
or otherwise. Hathaway has argued that because the 1951 
convention has not provided for voluntary repatriation, it 
is “wishful legal thinking to suggest that a voluntariness 
requirement can be superimposed on the text of the Refugee 
Convention.”23 The requirement of voluntariness is found 
only in the statute establishing the Office of the UNHCR, 
which requires the high commissioner to facilitate volun-
tary repatriation.24 In addition, the Executive Committee 
(ExCom) of the Office of the UNHCR has adopted conclu-
sions emphasizing the voluntary character of repatriation.25 
From a legal positivist perspective, the statute of the Office 
of the UNHCR and ExCom conclusions are not treaties and 
therefore not positive law.26
By contrast, the 1969 AU Convention explicitly states 
that repatriation should be voluntary.27 And while there is 
disagreement on whether there is any legal basis at inter-
national law for the voluntary character of repatriation,28 
we submit that in the context of Africa, the legal basis for 
the international and voluntary character of repatriation is 
article 5 of the 1969 AU Convention, which emphasizes the 
voluntary character of repatriation.
Repatriation in the literature is often discussed in rela-
tion to “safe return” and the right of return.29 It is never dis-
cussed explicitly in the context of citizenship, with empha-
sis on the status of the person being a refugee. We treat 
repatriation as part of the exercise of the right of citizenship 
and not merely the desired solution to the refugee as a prob-
lem. Repatriation has typically been touted by national and 
international policy-makers as the best solution. This focus 
on repatriation not only has implications for the role that the 
other solutions (resettlement and integration) play in deal-
ing with problems faced by refugees and finding permanent 
solutions, but also ignores the realities experienced by refu-
gees, especially when return is coerced under the dubious 
concept of “safe return.”30 Increasingly, refugees have little 
choice in matters of repatriation. For instance, Rwandan 
refugees in Uganda, who were pressed to return to Rwanda, 
talked about their fear that return would not be voluntary, 
referring to previous repatriation experiences in which 
people have been forcibly repatriated. For some, it was the 
experience of being forced out of Tanzania in the late 1990s; 
for others it was coming under attack from the Rwandan 
army in the camps in eastern DRC; others had been forced 
out of Uganda in 2006. As one man said, “They told us that 
before the 31 July 2009, we had to return to Rwanda. People 
were afraid. We remembered Kabahinde and Kibati. And 
we remembered the forceful repatriation from Tanzania 
when a lot of people were hurt—some were decapitated and 
others were killed in road accidents.”31 The current initiative 
was seen as a continuation of similar exercises: “I think this 
repatriation is forced. I remember what happened in Tanza-
nia, Congo, Burundi. I remember what happened in Kibati 
in 2006. Those who want to go back, they can. You don’t 
need a UNHCR convoy for that.”32
New leadership in the countries of origin and the end of 
open conflict are often assumed to constitute an end to the 
circumstances that forced refugees into exile, and refugees 
are put under varying types of pressure to return, from 
the threat of withdrawal of assistance to actual withdrawal 
or forcible return. For example, in 2011 the government of 
Tanzania forced Burundian refugees through a new screen-
ing process and more rigorously enforced regulations for-
bidding them from travelling more than four kilometres 
outside the refugee camp.33 When these measures proved 
ineffective in pressuring refugees to leave, cessation (with-
drawal of refugee status) was formally invoked, and a forced 
return operation was undertaken.
A number of key findings on repatriation emerged from 
the research. The first focuses on the question of when 
repatriation is appropriate and how that can be deter-
mined. In exploring the views of Rwandan refugees living 
in Uganda in late 2009, at a time when the potential dec-
laration of cessation was hanging over them, the research 
found that refugees were frightened about the prospect of 
returning to Rwanda, as indicated in the quotations above. 
The fears of the refugees highlighted the pitfalls in relying 
primarily on the absence of open conflict as a benchmark 
against which to promote return. Although many refugees 
will seek to return at the first sign of abating conflict, there 
will inevitably be huge variation within any group of refu-
gees, and for many a lack of open conflict will not be enough. 
The assumption that all can return at once may lead to a lack 
of safety for those who are not ready to return voluntarily. 
Instead, the assessment of whether or not return is timely 
should be considered in terms of refugees’ voluntary choices 
as citizens who can determine when it is risky for them flee 
and seek safety in exile, and when conditions are favourable 
for them to return home and they are able to renegotiate 
access to effective citizenship on return. Making this assess-
ment will focus on political openness and factors such as 
good governance and effective systems of justice. It will 
also recognize variations within the refugee community: 
there may be situations in which the majority of refugees 
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are able to recreate these bonds, but others are not able, as 
a result, for instance, of their political, ethnic, or religious 
profile. Consideration of these factors and a more individ-
ual approach to repatriation will more reliably predict when 
it is not only safe to return home, but when return will be a 
genuinely permanent solution.
Yet the findings showed that the governments of Rwanda 
and Uganda and the UNHCR in 2009 were ignoring these 
criteria. The government of Rwanda’s arguments in favour 
of repatriation focused on the genocide and its immediate 
aftermath (particularly armed conflict up to 1998) as the 
main cause of exile. However, the findings showed that 
ongoing political repression in Rwanda was not only pre-
venting many refugees from returning, it was generating 
new refugees: almost a quarter of all those interviewed had 
arrived in Uganda since 2001, indicating that the promotion 
of voluntary repatriation, much less invocation of the cessa-
tion clause, should be approached with caution.
The absence of armed conflict was also a key factor in 
motivating UNHCR and the government of Uganda to con-
sider cessation (although at the level of the government of 
Uganda it is worth noting that it was never implemented). 
This approach failed to recognize that war and violence may 
profoundly reshape a polity and can create new threats to 
individuals who may continue to require protection as refu-
gees. In fact, Rwandan refugees in Uganda described them-
selves as victims of a “war on individuals” by a repressive 
government, highlighting their desire to show the precar-
iousness of their situation, but also its individualized nature.
Ultimately, successful repatriation genuinely reasserts 
the bond of citizenship between citizen and state, per-
mitting the latter to protect the former and the former to 
engage in dialogue on the nature of the protection required. 
In this context, assessment of the appropriateness of return 
should focus on those elements that are most likely to 
determine the success of this renegotiation. Critical to this 
assessment are questions about governmental and societal 
discrimination, restrictions on freedom of movement, 
denial of property rights, access to justice, and exclusion 
from governance. Without the opportunity to re-establish 
the state and citizen bond and the realization of their full 
rights as citizens, therefore, refugees are likely to continue 
to resist return—and others who face similar exclusion will 
continue to flee. And critical to this assessment is the fact 
that it is the refugees themselves who will usually be in the 
best position to make the assessment of whether this bond 
can be re-established.
A second finding was the way in which citizenship 
provides a lens for negotiating how repatriation, when 
appropriate, takes place. Policy-makers and implement-
ers often construct the repatriation of a refugee in a linear 
progression; it is typically understood as a single course 
of action in one direction: a refugee leaves exile, crosses a 
border, returns home, and reaches a basic level of reintegra-
tion. As they cross the border, refugees shed their refugee 
status, thereby becoming persons no longer of “concern” to 
the international community. Within this official process, 
repatriation looks like a primarily humanitarian enterprise. 
However, while this essentially humanitarian boxing of 
people and processes may be helpful inasmuch as refugees 
and returnees leverage the assistance it provides, the process 
is not only fundamentally at odds with the wider political 
and economic context and does not make sense of people’s 
survival strategies, it also robs them of the autonomy to 
decide for themselves what is right. At worst, it undermines 
people’s coping mechanisms: in trying to promote protec-
tion, narrow approaches to repatriation effectively limit or 
compromise it.
If viewed through the lens of citizenship, however, suc-
cessful repatriation does not entail just stepping over a bor-
der: it is a long-term process of negotiated access to human 
rights protection and is strengthened by addressing threats 
to post-conflict recovery and reconstruction. It is highly 
complex and intimately connected with the political and 
economic context. From this perspective, the refugee is a 
citizen with autonomy to decide when and how to return 
home, which might involve several journeys between the 
country of exile and the home country and also establish-
ing long-term relationships across the border long after the 
experiences of exile.
Our research with South Sudanese refugees in Uganda 
in 2010, in the midst of official repatriation, showed that 
refugees went to great lengths to take flexible approaches to 
repatriation. Some families spread themselves geographic-
ally, with a number of family members repatriating while 
others waited in Uganda, either to see whether stabil-
ity would continue or to allow children to continue their 
education. Such coping strategies were found to have been 
crucial during South Sudan’s escalating conflict. Taking a 
gradual approach was also seen as important, as it allowed 
some family members to rebuild and lay the groundwork for 
others to return.
This experience highlights the importance of flexible 
repatriation processes and, in particular, the importance 
of allowing refugees and returnees mobility in order to 
make the most appropriate decisions for themselves. To the 
extent that citizenship entails reforming links with com-
munities, refugees and returnees need to be able to move 
within and between states as they renegotiate linkages and 
access to resources. As Long asserts, during repatriation 
and post-conflict reconstruction, “mobility offers a possible 
means to offset many of the weaknesses of physical return 
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programmes by providing access to alternative social, eco-
nomic and cultural resources outside of the state of origin 
that may benefit refugees, their families and communities, 
and their home state.”34 From this perspective, repatriation 
policies should not undermine citizenship and the oppor-
tunities it offers to refugees when they choose to end their 
displacement.
Third, the findings demonstrated that the relationship 
between repatriation and citizenship may further be com-
plicated by the local politics of belonging. While, at the 
national level, citizenship and belonging may be defined by 
citizenship legislation, at the local level citizenship may be 
defined differently. In some cases local structures may be 
more open. For example, self-settled (South) Sudanese refu-
gees in Uganda paid local taxes in order to leverage greater 
acceptance at the local level.35 In other cases, it can be more 
restrictive, with local communities insisting on criteria of 
“indigenousness” as the basis of belonging. In this context, 
repatriation is caught between civic understandings of 
belonging, localized ethnic forms of belonging and citizen-
ship, and notions of indigeneity, as illustrated by a group of 
Kinyarwanda-speaking (Tutsi) Congolese refugees living in 
a camp in Rwanda in 2011. The right of this group to belong is 
particularly contested, with many Congolese insisting that 
the refugees are actually Rwandan. The official repatriation 
process that was being considered included a mechanism by 
which returnees would be formally vetted by local author-
ities to determine whether or not they belonged in the 
areas to which they were to return. This mechanism, while 
essentially problematic, represents a unique formalization 
of processes that usually take place in informal and poorly 
documented ways. The process proposed was an interest-
ing model but cannot be assessed, because in practice it was 
never deployed.
In the absence of an actual process, those who were con-
sidering a return to DRC recognized that in order for return 
to be viable, they would need to negotiate their legitimacy to 
belong nationally and locally. Refugees talked about the need 
to return as recognized Congolese citizens and not as Tutsis 
or Kinyarwanda speakers. They saw that their group identity 
had become a major source of instability and that the ability 
to genuinely (re)engage with the state as a citizen would be a 
key factor in determining the safety and durability of their 
return. However, they recognized that national acceptance 
had limited salience if they were not also accepted in the local 
areas from which they came, where they had land and prop-
erty. The interaction between local and national belonging, 
therefore, was seen as a key factor in determining the ability 
to return and re-access livelihoods.
Fourth, the research demonstrated that land is a vital 
link between repatriation and citizenship: citizenship and 
belonging are intricately intertwined with land ownership; 
and land ownership is rooted in local belonging. These con-
nections were illustrated by the research carried out with 
Burundian returnees from Tanzania in 2009, while Burundi 
was going through long and painful reconstruction after 
decades of violence, political turmoil, and displacement. In 
this context, the research showed that land was fundamental 
in creating an authentic reinstatement of the bond between 
citizen and state that had been violently broken: its equitable 
and just distribution was key to the reconstruction, recon-
ciliation, and peace-building then taking place in Burundi.
The government of Burundi’s policy of encouraging 
returnees to share “their” land with those they found living 
on it at the point of return (land that may have been wrongly 
appropriated, but on which many had been living for over 
three decades) was creating tension between returnees and 
those who had not fled. In these areas, the government of 
Burundi faced an unwinnable challenge with land claim-
ants building strong legal cases and not enough land to go 
around. Solutions needed to focus on relieving pressure by 
creating alternative ways providing what the population 
was seeking through land—livelihoods and belonging. In 
this way, access to land could be addressed through a pro-
cess that would rebuild civic trust and ensure the genuine 
reintegration of these former refugees.
Repatriation, therefore, when viewed through a citizen-
ship lens, opens discussion on a broad range of dynamics 
and issues, all of which are critical to the creation of long-
term stability. Ultimately, the way in which repatriation 
takes place can either destabilize a fragile situation or con-
tribute to breaking cycles of violence and displacement. In 
the case of the latter, the genuine rebuilding of the bond of 
citizenship and belonging at both a national and local level 
are key.
Local Integration and Citizenship
Although article 34 of the 1951 convention stipulates that 
“contracting States shall as far as possible facilitate the 
assimilation and naturalisation of refugees,” local integra-
tion through obtaining citizenship of host states has not 
been a priority in the Great Lakes region. The UNHCR defines 
local integration as including legal, economic, and social 
elements. The legal element is defined as “the establishment 
of a legal framework in which refugees gradually attain a 
wider range of rights in the host State—possibly, but not 
necessarily, leading to full citizenship and naturalisation.”36 
While recognition of the multiple elements of integration 
is positive, the fact that citizenship is not seen as a require-
ment is evidence of how hard it is to obtain in many parts 
of the world. It also raises questions about the durability of 
that integration without full citizenship.
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In the Great Lakes region, the prospects of refugees 
acquiring citizenship are limited. Citizenship is generally 
accessible by birth, registration, or naturalization, but in 
many cases, there are legal obstacles. In most of the Great 
Lakes region, citizenship by birth is accessible only on the 
basis of inheritance (jus sanguinis) and not on the basis 
of birth in the country (jus soli), so citizenship cannot be 
extended automatically to the children of refugees, even if 
several generations are born in exile. While this situation 
does leave open the possibility of accessing citizenship 
through either registration or naturalization, in practice 
this rarely happens. In Uganda, for instance, even after refu-
gees have lived in the country for over three decades, their 
children and grandchildren born in Uganda are explicitly 
excluded from citizenship by registration.37 And while a 
person who has lived in Uganda for at least ten years can, 
in theory, apply for Ugandan citizenship by registration, he 
or she must have come to Uganda legally and voluntarily;38 
this requirement automatically disqualifies refugees who 
came to Uganda involuntarily in response to war or fear of 
persecution in their countries more than thirty years ago. 
Refugees who have lived in Uganda for more than twenty 
years could explore the possibility to naturalize.39 The 
Uganda Citizenship and Immigration Control Act defines 
the criteria for acquisition of citizenship by naturalization 
and does not exclude refugees.40 And crucially, the Refugee 
Act, 2006, also provides for refugees to acquire citizenship 
by registration, but only for “recognized” refugees.41
In most countries in the region it is theoretically possible 
for a refugee to naturalize, although there are many legal 
obstacles to doing so. In the DRC, for instance, naturaliza-
tion requires approval by the National Assembly and the 
applicant must have performed “major services” to the 
country—criteria that few, let alone refugees, are likely to 
meet. In Rwanda, applicants for nationality must be free 
of “genocide ideology,” a vague legal construct that has 
been used to persecute opponents. Other obstacles include 
requirements for very long periods of residency to apply for 
naturalization and filing fees that place the process out of 
reach of most refugees, even when they would otherwise 
qualify.
In other cases, political considerations become an 
obstacle, as was seen in the research from 2008 and 2013 on 
Burundi refugees who had been living in Tanzania since the 
1970s. The government of Tanzania was offering citizenship 
to these refugees through naturalization, with the UNHCR 
covering the cost of filing, in order to ensure that refugees 
were able to access the process. Yet refugees were contesting 
the nature and quality of citizenship they had been offered. 
It came with a catch: to obtain their citizenship certificate, 
refugees were being asked to relocate to other areas of the 
country—a requirement with no justification under the law. 
They were being asked to leave their homes of the past three 
or four decades (a lifetime for most) and start again with 
people they did not know. The potential within national 
belonging, in this instance, was jeopardized by a rupture in 
local forms of belonging. Without their community struc-
tures around them, built through decades of exile, their 
coping mechanisms were going to be severely eroded and, 
for many, the inflexibility of the process undermined its 
potential.
Refugees were apprehensive about the extent to which 
citizenship on the basis of forced relocation would allow for 
full access to rights and, most crucially, the ability to secure 
their livelihoods. For the majority of those interviewed, 
therefore, the possibility of staying in Tanzania as legitimate 
citizens but retaining the potential to return to Burundi was 
the optimal outcome—and one that did seemed reasonable 
for a group of refugees who have spent almost four decades 
living in exile and uncertainty.
For the government and policy-makers, the ambivalence 
of refugees who were refusing the unique opportunity to 
gain Tanzanian citizenship on the basis of having to move 
from the settlement, or who were talking about the pos-
sibility of returning to Burundi in the future, was seen as 
unacceptable and difficult to understand. Policy-makers 
premise Tanzanian citizenship as both a permanent and 
exclusive national identity, and a “solution” that should end 
concerns about the availability of protection. From the per-
spective of the refugees, however, there was little evidence 
that either would be a panacea, fully addressing all rights, 
security, and livelihoods issues.
Although the issue has recently been resolved, inasmuch 
as the government of Tanzania is no longer making citizen-
ship contingent upon relocation, the discussion that led 
to this decision reveals the tension between the refugees’ 
understanding of citizenship and that of the Tanzanian 
authorities, and raises fundamental policy questions about 
the nature of citizenship in the context of a multiplicity of 
identities and ties. In particular, it demonstrates that while 
policy-makers generally see naturalization as the end point 
of integration, refugees see it as distinct from their “empir-
ical citizenship,” which is just beginning to be established 
and is influenced by, but distinct from, the offer of national 
citizenship.
One issue that came through as critically important in 
establishing empirical citizenship was the need for freedom 
of movement and residence. Not only are such freedoms 
critical in allowing refugees to seek out the place or places 
where they have greatest possibility to ensure their local 
belonging, it is also a gateway to other rights. For instance, 
refugees who are able to move freely are more likely to be able 
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to access livelihoods. These principles are well reinforced by 
international law.
Rethinking Durable Solutions in the Context of 
Citizenship
Two main conclusions are drawn from this review of under-
lying causes of conflict-induced displacement in the Great 
Lakes and the status quo on policy instruments on durable 
solutions to the plight of refugees in the region and the 
role that citizenship could play in providing such a solu-
tion. First, post-independence leaders failed to reform the 
colonial state and reorganize political power to address dis-
crimination, inequality, and politicized identities that were 
legally embedded within the colonial state. As a result, the 
default position—at least at a political level—appears to be 
the exclusion of those considered outsiders, rather than to 
make efforts to encourage their integration. A key conse-
quence is failure to adopt citizenship policies and criteria 
that are inclusive, and that, in turn, explains why hundreds 
of thousands of refugees, despite living in exile for decades, 
are still unable to access citizenship. And even in excep-
tional cases such as Tanzania where refugees were offered 
citizenship—either as a result of pan-Africanist idealism or 
as a solution to ending refugee status and integrating them 
into Tanzanian society—it has been construed in inflexible 
terms, giving refugees limited space to organize their lives 
as citizens with multiple identities and sense of belonging.
Second, the way in which refugee policies have been 
implemented has paid inadequate attention to the dynamics 
of inclusion and exclusion that are a common feature in any 
context, not least where resources are limited. Instead of 
refugees being seen as an asset, their presence has consist-
ently been constructed as a threat, ensuring that their status 
as outsiders is embedded in the humanitarian response (as 
opposed to a political response) to refugees.
Problems in both citizenship policy and the way in 
which the refugee regime is constructed and implemented 
within this context, conspire to reinforce these problems 
rather than resolve them, creating the cycles of violence 
and conflict that we continue to see in the Great Lakes. 
Instead, policies have exacerbated the trend of exclusion 
by isolating refugees in camps, restricting their movement, 
and offering limited resettlement places. This isolationist 
approach is reminiscent of the way in which colonial and 
post-independence rulers excluded “outsider” communities 
from the benefits of citizenship and established a patronage 
system that allowed those in power to manipulate and con-
trol political power to their advantage. Refugee policies have 
continued to see refugees as outsiders, as being not ethnic-
ally and/or historically connected to the countries in which 
they have sought refuge.
Indeed, the status of refugees as outsiders has been exacer-
bated by the humanitarian response to refugee issues. This 
bedrock of exclusion has had two negative consequences 
for refugees and their host communities. First, refugees, as 
objects of charity, are treated as passive victims who must 
be cared for and maintained by an elaborate international 
bureaucracy assisted by local actors.42 Second, many refu-
gee groups have lived for decades without solutions to their 
plight, unable to integrate into the community. These “pro-
tracted refugee situations” have been blamed on the condi-
tions in their country of origin rather than the inability for 
the host state and other interests to allow their inclusion.43 
As a result, for decades refugee policies in the region and 
Africa as a whole have not only failed to provide the major-
ity of refugees with solutions to their plight or address their 
aspirations, but have failed to benefit host communities in 
a meaningful way. As a result, refugee policy has failed for 
the same reasons that citizenship policies and laws in post-
independence Africa have failed to avert the political crises 
that engulfed the region and Africa as a whole.
A New Approach to Refugee Policy
The way forward, we suggest, is a realignment of refugee poli-
cies in the region in a way that makes them inclusive, focus-
ing on the dignity and resourcefulness of refugees. Refu-
gee policies need to view refugees as citizens and rational 
actors, notwithstanding their displacement, who are best 
placed, either as individuals or in communion with others, 
to determine what their interests are and how to protect 
them. This would translate into a policy that promotes an 
organic interaction between refugees and host communities 
that starts at the onset of a refugee influx and allows both 
to mutually benefit from each other; that identifies poten-
tial areas of tension and encourages collaboration between 
both communities to identify ways of removing the cause of 
that tension; and that allows local actors to benefit from the 
economic and business opportunities that result from the 
presence of the refugees and thereby minimizes xenophobia.
Ultimately, however, both refugee and citizenship law 
and policy need to be realigned: refugee policy, as with 
citizenship policy, needs to shed its emphasis on fear, exclu-
sion, manipulation, ethnicity, and historical ties to terri-
tory, and instead be rooted in values such as community, 
protection of strangers, equality, fairness, and justice that 
transcend the current preoccupation with refugees as a 
problem. Indeed, on the basis of these values, refugee host-
ing communities are often the first “humanitarian actors” 
to protect refugees: progressive refugee policy could tap into 
this goodwill instead of undermining it.
In addition to community value systems, international 
law, its weaknesses and inherent biases notwithstanding,44 
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in particular human rights law could provide some basis for 
realigning refugee policy. Article 26 of the 1951 convention, 
for example, stipulates that “each Contracting State shall 
accord refugees lawfully in its territory the right to choose 
the place of their residence and to move freely within its 
territory.” This right is subject only to “any regulations 
applicable to aliens generally in the same circumstances.” 
A general limitation to this right might be article 9 of the 
convention, which allows a contracting state, “in time of 
war or other grave and exceptional circumstances” to take 
“provisionally measures which it considers to be essential 
to the national security.” But this provision does not give 
contracting states a free ride; it must relate to a particular 
refugee, “pending a determination by the Contracting State 
that the person is in fact a refugee and that continuance of 
such measure is in the interest of national security.” Thus, 
refugee policy premised on the right to freedom of move-
ment and choice of residence will give refugees agency and 
allow them to integrate in the communities in ways that 
benefit them and their host communities.
Related to the right to freedom of movement and choice 
of residence as a key aspect of a progressive refugee policy 
is the non-discrimination obligation imposed on states 
by some international human rights instruments. As 
stated above, current refugee policy is premised on a care 
and maintenance paradigm that requires refugees to be 
encamped with most of their rights restricted. Encampment 
on the basis of refugee status is a form of discrimination 
and offends the provisions of most international human 
rights instruments. Article 2 of the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples Rights, for example, stipulates, “Every 
individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights 
and freedoms recognized and guaranteed in the present 
Charter without distinction of any kind such as race, ethnic 
group, colour, sex, language, religion, political or any other 
opinion, national and social origin, fortune, birth or other 
status.” Article 2 (1) of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) categorically enjoins contract-
ing states to “ensure to all individuals within its territory 
and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the 
present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such 
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opin-
ion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”
Thus, refugee and citizenship policies have much in com-
mon and can be reformed by adopting inclusive criteria 
already in existence within the repository of community 
value systems or international law and international human 
rights instruments.
Conclusion
The problem of conflict, displacement, and refugees in the 
region is, to a large extent, intertwined with the crisis of cit-
izenship. There are theories advanced to explain the causes 
of the problem, including ethnicity, the legacy of colonial 
rule, the failure to reform the colonial state by post-colonial 
leaders, violations of human rights, and the logic of “sover-
eignty and state.” While all these ideas shed some light on 
the causes of the problem, at the core of these factors is the 
logic of inclusion and exclusion. Seen from this perspective, 
the dialectic between civic public and primordial public, 
or civic citizenship and ethnic citizenship, or the logic of 
sovereignty and state, are simply manifestations of a predis-
position to include or exclude others—a phenomenon that 
is by no means unique to Africa.
Access to and control of finite resources such as land and 
the mineral wealth in the region drive exclusion or inclu-
sion. In particular, ethnicity and historical ties to territory 
are commonly used to either legitimatize an indigenous 
group’s or de-legitimatize the newcomer’s claim to access 
and control over these resources. This struggle for access to 
and control of these resources has forced ethnic identities 
to take on hardened and aggressive boundaries, which has 
inevitably resulted in conflict and its attendant ramifications.
The presence of refugees intersects with many of these 
dynamics. Yet policy instruments fail to address these issues, 
in particular through the ongoing emphasis on repatriation 
and encampment of refugees that ignores the relationship 
between return and the versatility of citizenship. Inextricably 
linked to this lack of success is the fact that de jure local inte-
gration is not considered a solution for refugees, even those 
who have lived in exile for extended periods of time, many for 
generations: most states in the region restrict access to their 
citizenship for refugees. The international processes initiated 
for the region, such as the International Conference on the 
Great Lakes Region, while resulting in broad policy instru-
ments that addressed discrimination, racism, ethnicism, 
exclusion, and national unity, never tackled citizenship as 
an explicit problem and its connections with racism, ethni-
cism, exclusion, and national unity.
Current approaches to refugee protection and embed-
ded structures are profoundly harmful in their outcome 
and continue to fail to adequately provide solutions to their 
plight. A radical reform of governance structures—locally, 
regionally, nationally, and internationally—that repeatedly 
fail the citizenry they claim to represent is urgently needed.
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